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1 
 
Global governance and human rights have rarely been considered 
in relation to each another.  Here I explore their connections with 
special attention to the rhetoric of international justice.  The result 
is an argument that combining these two sets of perspectives can 
give us a better understanding of global politics. 
 
 
2 
 
I begin by showing what perspectives of global governance can 
offer those of us who have taken traditional approaches to human 
rights.  Then I turn things around to discuss what perspectives of 
human rights can add to previous treatments of global 
governance.  To illustrate how they can complement each other, I 
analyze the problematical “Pinochet precedent.”  And to project 
politics where global governance and human rights learn from 
each other, I conclude by relating global governance to two 
competing perspectives on international justice. 
 
 
 
 
1.    The Global Governance Contribution 
       to Studies of Human Rights  
 
3 
 
Mainstream treatments of human rights traditionally center on 
nation-states.  This is, perhaps, as it should be.  Nation-states are 
the primary violators of human rights.  At the same time, they bear 
the principal responsibilities under international law for 
promoting basic rights.  Research on human rights has turned 
recently to an added focus on at least some non-state actors that 
also violate rights.  This important step addresses the impact of 
economic actors, especially transnational corporations (TNCs), on 
human rights.  It has helped the attention to human rights learn 
from developments in global relations and advances in theories of 
international relations (IR).  Yet further developments in global 
politics and IR theories demand still greater expansion for the 
horizons of human rights.  The time has come for them to face 
global governance. 
 
 
4 
 
Global governance (GG) is a relatively recent paradigm for policy 
makers and IR theorists.  Early GG work focused on international 
organizations (IOs), especially the United Nations.  The end of the 
Cold War, combined with the centrality of the UN Security Council 
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for legitimizing the Gulf War of 1991, led to hopes that the UN 
would become a stronger and more influential body.  UN 
supporters popularized the term “global governance” because they 
wanted to distinguish between it and “global government.”  
Governance is a broader term.  It addresses political management 
on a global scale but management that stops short of the formal 
powers and procedures of a government.  GG is specifically not 
about a world state or the creation of some supranational body 
that would have control or sovereignty above that of the nation-
state. 
 
5 
 
The Commission on Global Governance published its initial report 
in 1995.  One GG theorist defines global governance as the 
resolution of global issues “in political spaces that lack centralized 
authority” (Hoffman 2005).  Hence GG turns away from any ideas 
about making the UN into some sort of global state, federal or 
otherwise.  In many areas of GG, moreover, the UN has little or no 
part to play.  An example is the Pinochet precedent discussed 
below. 
 
 
6 
 
By extension, GG has become a catchall phrase to denote all recent 
developments that depart from state sovereignty and the 
traditional IR focus on the Westphalian system of relations among 
nation-states.  Therefore a GG approach requires that our 
attention to human rights (and similar topics) cover states and 
national interests (the standard stuff of Realpolitik); but it also 
must encompass non-state actors (TNCs, ethnic groups, non-
governmental organizations, and more), global civil society (social 
movements, NGOs again, etc.); regional and international IOs; 
even key individuals. 
 
 
7 
 
GG deconstructs the old “levels of analysis” conundrum from 
international relations.  If we want to understand global problems 
such as human rights or environmental destruction, the chronic 
debate has been about what level is best for conducting the 
analysis.  GG argues that all levels of analysis may be relevant.  It 
shows, furthermore, that events and actors on these many levels 
now interpenetrate or even fuse with one another so thoroughly 
that the old IR perspectives of realism, neorealism, and neoliberal 
institutionalism become archaic. 
 
 
8 
 
A quick synopsis of the evolution of mainstream IR theory should 
clarify the GG case.  IR theory has always struggled to keep up with 
the world.  Classical IR theory, from Thucydides to Machiavelli 
and into the era after the Second World War, sought to understand 
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states and national power.  When Hans Morgenthau wrote the 
seminal postwar text for realism (1948), the demise of realism had 
already begun in practice.  Critics of realism proposed several 
alternatives.  The most prominent replacement has been 
“interdependence” or “neoliberalism.”  Its advocates have argued 
that fallacies riddle realism and neo-realism, which focus on 
military power and pessimistically see anarchy or at least conflict 
as the permanent condition for international affairs.  
Interdependence theorists stress non-military resources, 
international cooperation, and common interests in generating a 
more optimistic sense of international relations. 
 
9 
 
The changing character of global politics has virtually forced these 
revisions in IR theory.  Global economic crises from oil embargoes 
in the 1970s to financial “meltdowns” in the 1990s have shown that 
a single-minded stress on security or interdependence leaves huge 
holes in our ability to explain global events.  Efforts to fill these 
gaps produced “regime theory” as a successor to analyses of 
complex interdependence.  It recognizes international “regimes” as 
important actors in their own right; and it treats economic 
regimes, such as the one led by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, as forces that are more than the sum of their 
parts – the member governments.  Hence this chapter in 
revisionist IR theory came to be called “neoliberal 
institutionalism.” 
 
 
10 
 
In its practical sense, the turn to devices of global governance is 
simply the next wave of occurrences that IR theory seeks to 
explain; but it leads accordingly to a next chapter in IR theory.  
Global governance labels what has been happening; it describes 
recent events.  It also extends regime theory in ways that are 
appropriate empirically, logically, and normatively. 
 
 
11 
 
As a school of thought, in other words, GG is descriptive, 
explanatory, and prescriptive.  GG is descriptive because it claims 
that the devolution of national sovereignty is a demonstrable fact.  
It is explanatory because it tells why the devolution is occurring.  
And it is prescriptive in at least two ways.  GG recommends 
policies that can help states and IOs cope with rapid changes in the 
world.  Yet it also endorses the changes.  GG theorists believe that 
the world will be better when we manage global challenges such as 
terrorism, ecological catastrophe, and human rights through 
integrated, multilevel, non-violent cooperation rather than 
resurgent, unilateral, neo-realist wars. 
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2.    A Human Rights Contribution 
       to Theories of Global Governance  
 
12 
 
Human rights analyses need to be informed by GG theory in order 
to keep current with global events and IR theory.  GG theory, in 
turn, needs to learn from students of human rights in order to gain 
a normative intelligence that IR theory sometimes lacks. 
 
 
13 
 
In Approaches to Global Governance Theory, Martin Hewson and 
Timothy J. Sinclair (1999) identify three schools of thought within 
GG theory.  One uses GG as a new way to target and enhance the 
work of international organizations, especially the UN.  The 
Commission on Global Governance is the best-known example. 
 
 
14 
 
Another treats GG as a revision of regime theory.  Regime theory 
dominated the 1980s as a way to understand global politics within 
a series of issue areas.  It has appreciated the late-twentieth-
century proliferation of new regimes, including the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as a way to “govern” trade relations.  With the 
number of new regimes for particular issue areas (especially 
environmental affairs) beginning to approach a hundred, some 
scholars started to talk about such overlapping webs of regimes as 
a “system of international governance” (p. 12).  This makes GG a 
logical step beyond earlier efforts at regime theory. 
 
 
15 
 
Hewson and Sinclair identify the IO and regime-theory variants of 
GG largely to reject them in favor of a third approach:  GG as a way 
to understand global change.  The trouble is that GG as 
“perspectives on global change” is little more than a residual 
category.  Into it, Hewson and Sinclair dump all GG theory that 
does not specifically address IOs or regimes then champion this 
“approach” as superior to the other two.  The IO and regime 
variants take only a page a piece to summarize; GG as a theory of 
“change” requires page after page on economic globalization, the 
location of authority, integration, fragmentation, patterns of 
“global life,” micro and macro levels, global civil society, Eastern 
European dissidents, indigenous peoples movements, 
cosmopolitan democracy, international political economy, 
transnational coalitions of social forces, hyper-liberalism, finance 
ministries of G-7 governments, transnational political-ideological 
tendencies, the Davos forum, the Trilateral Commission, 
globalizing elites, the new constitutionalism, epistemic elites, 
knowledge brokers, informational elites, even a heuristic 
“ontology” that highlights epistemic authorities and markets and 
technologies.  (Phew!)  In fact, this is just a beginning of the 
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relevant topics, because Hewson and Sinclair group together any 
developments aside from IOs and issue regimes that involve 
change.  (And what doesn’t?) 
 
16 
 
To pursue as “good” GG theory that which analyzes change is to 
seek something opposite from Occam’s razor.  Hewson and 
Sinclair argue that it is “misplaced” to criticize their approach for 
including “virtually everything” (p. 17).  But what could possibly be 
outside or beyond their version of GG? 
 
 
17 
 
Actually there is something missing, not only from GG as a focus 
on global change, but also from the IO and regime approaches.  It 
is what a human-rights perspective on GG most readily supplies:  
direct, intelligent attention to values.  Human rights provide a 
fourth, normative approach to GG, enabling it to do several things 
that the other three approaches cannot. 
 
 
18 
 
A full-fledged normative approach connected with human rights 
can criticize the merely functional treatment of norms by IO and 
regime accounts of GG.  IO and regime versions of GG implicate 
only narrow (and often competing) norms.  Thus the UN Charter 
defines that body primarily as a tool for international peace, 
human development, and human rights.  Are all other values to 
serve or be summarized by those three goals?  At least as handled 
by IO and regime approaches, such goals omit too much.  Likewise 
the standard, textbook definition of regimes first offered by 
Stephen Krasner (1982) relates institutional structures only to 
operational norms.  To approach GG through human rights is to 
articulate a more general and adequate account of the many 
dimensions of “change” that Hewson and Sinclair find crucial. 
 
 
19 
 
A directly normative approach can cut across the other three to 
provide political coverage lacked even by the kitchen-sink 
perspective on change.  A GG focus on rights and, by extension, 
norms can encompass the confusing diversity of the world’s many 
cultures.  Humans can be set apart from each other by so much:  
religion, ideology, language, class, income, race, life chances, and 
more.  Yet all people have desires for human dignity, and no 
movement has more potential to promote human dignity than the 
international campaign for human rights.  The emphasis on 
human rights embraces lots of diversity, even debate, and these are 
among its advantages.  But all treatments of human rights – 
Western, Asian, Islamic, indigenous, no matter how disparate – 
advance visions of human dignity. 
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20 
 
A focus on human rights also can turn GG away from the implicitly 
realist and positivist epistemologies that bedevil the other 
approaches.  Again the introductory rhetoric of Hewson and 
Sinclair makes the point.1  They say that their book’s purpose “is to 
understand the origins of forms of governance so as to anticipate 
their transformation into other forms over time, rather than the 
pragmatic concerns of most positivist or problem-solving work 
with making the existing system of global governance more 
effective” (1999, p. 17).  Saying that they are not “positivists” who 
do “problem-solving work,” the authors nevertheless finish their 
sentence by invoking the positivist dichotomy between fact and 
value or description and prescription.  Thus they claim to describe 
the origins and transformations of GG rather than to prescribe 
ways for making it more effective. 
 
 
21 
 
The dichotomy is false, as any normative approach to GG – 
especially one focused on human rights – would demonstrate by 
showing how specific descriptions implicate prescriptions and vice 
versa.  To describe the transformations of GG is to prescribe paths 
for these changes to take.  Hence this essay concludes with several 
of my own prescriptions for global governance. 
 
 
22 
 
To prepare for that, the need is to examine how facts and values 
turn into each other in specific cases of global governance when we 
regard it as a challenge for human rights.  Several sustained 
examples come immediately to mind:  political immunity, the 
prosecution of dictators, and the International Criminal Court; 
TNCs and corporate social responsibility; labor rights, 
environmental rights, and the WTO; anti-terrorist policy, torture, 
and related violations of civil rights.  As promised, though, let me 
target a particularly concise and accessible case. 
 
 
 
 
3.    The Pinochet Precedent 
       and Global Governance  
 
23 
 
General Pinochet ruled Chile as dictator (and unelected president) 
from 1973-1990.  During this time, the agents of his junta 
committed more than three thousand political murders.  After 
years of internal resistance and international sanctions, Pinochet 
succumbed to pressure and allowed a plebiscite in 1988.  It was the 
first democratic election since he had seized power in a bloody 
coup fifteen years earlier.  Much to his surprise, the people of Chile 
voted “no” to another five years of his rule.  Pinochet gave up the 
presidency in 1990, but he remained as commander-in-chief 
(retaining effective power through his control of the military) until 
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1998. 
 
24 
 
Once Pinochet relinquished presidential power, the newly elected 
government created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), also called the Rettig Commission.  During the 1990s, it 
documented the junta’s crimes.  Eventually it attributed 3,197 
individual deaths to the Pinochet regime.  It also displayed 
evidence that hundreds (possibly thousands) of additional people 
remained missing after detainment by Pinochet’s security forces. 
 
 
25 
 
The TRC served as a substitute for prosecuting commanders and 
operatives of the dictatorship.  The Chilean military, still 
commanded by Pinochet, made clear that any effort to prosecute 
Pinochet would provoke another (unstoppable) coup.  Thus an 
indictment for Pinochet was a political impossibility from 1973 
until 1998.  Few inside Chile seriously suggested that he stand 
trial.  Everyone knew who was really in charge of the political 
system, so Pinochet acted with impunity because he continued to 
enjoy effective immunity from prosecution.  There were no serious 
attempts inside of Chile to hold Pinochet responsible for his 
crimes. 
 
 
26 
 
Then something remarkable happened.  In 1998, Pinochet went to 
London for medical treatment.  While he was there, a Spanish 
judge handed down an indictment for his arrest.  Judge Baltasar 
Garzon ruled that Pinochet must be extradited from England to 
stand trial for genocide, torture, and murder.  The murder charges 
centered on Spanish citizens killed during the 1973 coup when 
Pinochet took power.  The Spanish government said that it fully 
expected the British government to honor the request for 
extradition.  As a former head of state and a “Senator for Life” in 
Chile, Pinochet claimed diplomatic immunity from arrest, 
extradition, and prosecution. 
 
 
27 
 
The British government took sixteen months to act.  In the 
meantime, it held Pinochet under “house arrest” (in a mansion 
next to a golf course).  Great Britain and Spain are members of the 
European Union and the Council of Europe.  The EU and the COE 
require all members to honor the jurisdictions and orders of courts 
in other member countries.  Eventually British legal authorities 
decided that they had a specific obligation to extradite Pinochet 
due to obligations on Britain as a party to the international 
Convention Against Torture.  Since the United Kingdom had 
ratified this in 1988, British authorities ruled that the government 
must extradite Pinochet for any crimes he may have committed 
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after that year, and there were many such charges. 
 
28 
 
But Pinochet was not sent to Spain.  In the end, a British court 
ruled that the General was too ill (and perhaps too feeble-minded) 
to stand trial.  Britain returned Pinochet to Chile in March of 
2000. 
 
 
29 
 
From a human-rights perspective on global governance, though, 
this is when the case gets really interesting.  Even though they 
failed to put Pinochet on trial in Spain, these international efforts 
to prosecute Pinochet in a foreign court provoked his indictment at 
home.  Once Pinochet returned to Chile, his homeland launched 
unprecedented legal action against him.  In August of 2000, the 
Supreme Court stripped Pinochet of his Senatorial immunity.  In 
2001, the government charged Pinochet for the first time in a 
Chilean court with murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy.  The 
indictment cited seventy-five murders in the “caravan of death,” 
just weeks after the coup in September of 1973.  Even when the 
kidnapping and murder charges were later dropped, the 
conspiracy charges for the subsequent cover-up remained.  The 
Pinochet impunity had ended, and the IR perspective that best 
helps us understand the politics of this Pinochet precedent is 
global governance focused on human rights. 
 
 
30 
 
In this case, the key GG dynamic is the synergy among state 
policies (in Chile, Spain, and the UK), regional institutions (the EU 
and the COE), and the international regimes created under the 
Torture and the Genocide Conventions.  Officials such as Judge 
Garzon and NGOs in civil society, particularly Amnesty 
International, also played important roles in establishing the 
Pinochet precedent.  None of the efforts to prosecute Pinochet 
inside Chile could reasonably be expected to have occurred, even 
after 1998, without the previous efforts by Europeans to bring him 
to trial elsewhere. 
 
 
31 
 
Neither realism, neo-liberalism, regime theory, nor any other 
mainstream perspective on international relations sheds much 
light on these events.  None of these prior theories can speak to all 
of the levels of action and analysis crucial for the Pinochet 
precedent.  Not even analysis based on international law can 
comprehend the formal and informal processes of politics crucial 
in this case within Chile, Britain, and Spain.  A concentration on 
change could tell us only that an important precedent might have 
been established, without helping to show exactly how and why.  
Nor would attention to only international organizations or issue 
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regimes be sufficient for coming to terms with the Pinochet 
precedent.  To understand its dynamics and implications, 
attention to the fact-and-value dimensions of global governance is 
necessary. 
 
32 
 
As James Rosenau (1997) argues, one thing all these actors have in 
common is that they operate as “spheres of authority.”  This is how 
each contributes to global governance, and it leads Rosenau to 
make such spheres of authority into the units of analysis for global 
governance.  This helps highlight the many moves, disparate kinds, 
and shifting locations of political authority in our politics.  The 
modern paradigm of political authority was national sovereignty; 
but it is now being de-centered, fragmented, and otherwise 
realigned into the more complicated patterns that we can 
comprehend as global governance.  These transformations range 
from the micro levels of individuals who are addressing global 
audiences, through the middle levels of institutions that are 
forming civil societies on a global scale, to the macro levels where 
many governments and conventions continue to act.  Global 
governance is a texture of diverse spheres of authority that interact 
into ways often localizing as well as globalizing. 
 
 
 
 
4.  Implications of the Pinochet Precedent 
      for Global Governance 
      and for Human Rights 
 
 
33 
 
In descriptive terms, the Pinochet precedent is further evidence 
that global governance is upon us in fact.  This case shows the 
management of global issues in political spaces where there is 
nothing like overarching sovereignty.  GG exists.  There has been 
no centralized authority or comprehensive forum to deal with 
Pinochet’s crimes.  Nor is there a single authority that could end 
impunity for dictators by eliminating their effective immunity 
from later punishment for specific crimes.  Yet a globe with many 
interacting spheres of authority can contribute to a healthy 
recognition by officials and citizens that former dictators are liable 
for violating human rights.  Such spheres of authority have 
established the Pinochet precedent. 
 
 
34 
 
In prescriptive terms, the Pinochet case also indicates that much 
work remains.  Can there be a fair, effective, institutionalized 
process for bringing to justice elsewhere the dictators who enjoy 
immunity in their home countries from prosecution for violating 
human rights?  The ad hoc happenings that led to Pinochet’s 
indictment in Chile are not exactly reliable arrangements for the 
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actions that can help secure official respect for human rights. 
 
35 
 
One needed institution has already been created, although it 
remains in its infancy.  It is the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  President George W. Bush refuses to have the United States 
join the ICC, and his administration actively seeks to undermine 
it.  Yet the world needs a permanent court with jurisdiction over all 
such cases.  This need is even more evident after 9/11 (Hitchens 
2001).  The ICC can help close transnational loopholes that let 
dictators like Pinochet escape justice.  It can help establish clearer 
global standards against mass political murder.  It can become a 
standing court of last resort for cases when national courts fail.  
For sufficient power and legitimacy, however, the ICC needs the 
support of the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
5.  Whither Global Governance? 
      Global Governance and 
      International Justice 
 
 
36 
 
If we could learn from developments like the Pinochet precedent 
that global governance exists and should be strengthened, we 
would still need to know where to take things from here.  The first 
time I presented this argument for global governance, the audience 
had questions about its relationship to democracy and justice.2  
With good reason, people wanted to know how GG is, or should be, 
based on norms of participation and equity.  They wanted to know 
if diverse groups (in civil society) or various types of nations 
(especially in the developing world) can participate adequately in 
the processes of GG.  They wanted to know where GG is headed, 
and particularly if it is taking us closer to international justice. 
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Another presentation on that occasion helps me answer such 
questions by distinguishing between two approaches to justice.  
GG is not, I argue, a roadmap to international justice that can tell 
us specifically where to go because it knows in advance what 
counts as just.  It does not offer abstract principles of justice in the 
mode of John Rawls (1971) or prior criteria like Charles Beitz 
(1979).  Instead, to borrow from John Nelson (2004), GG pursues 
justice as “just getting by.” 
 
 
38 
 
The basics of Rawls’ Theory of Justice are widely familiar, so a 
thumbnail sketch may suffice.  For Rawls, “justice as fairness” for 
all parties to any social contract turns into two principles that are 
rational for anybody to choose in the “original position,” a thought 
experiment that imagines away all personal particulars:  income, 
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class, race, gender, generation, even risk proclivity.  First is the 
“efficiency principle” that all social values must be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution is somehow to everyone’s 
advantage.  Second is the “difference principle” that, when 
inequalities exist, they must redound to the benefit of the most 
marginal segments of society.  Just follow this blueprint; and 
whatever results is, by definition, “justice.” 
 
39 
 
Beitz applies these principles to international relations.  In the 
1971 tome, Rawls assumed that political borders set the limits for 
the social cooperation to produce public goods.  Hence his theory 
of justice would hold only within nation-states.  Observing that 
national boundaries do not limit cooperation, Beitz argues for 
applying the Rawls theory to IR to create an international system 
of distributive justice.  Especially in economics, says Beitz, 
international interdependence creates wealth that would not 
otherwise exist.  Beitz holds, therefore, that the Rawls approach is 
the equitable way to distribute the results of international 
cooperation.  No more than Rawls does Beitz specify such an 
arrangement, but their (liberal) idea is that abstract criteria can 
provide in advance a clear and necessary conception of justice.  
This is not the kind of international justice that global governance 
pursues. 
 
 
40 
 
GG has no a priori blueprint for democracy or justice.  It does not 
suppose that one size fits all.  What now makes one part of the 
world more democratic might at this time make another part less 
democratic.  What once made one aspect of global governance 
more just might now or later make it less just.  GG pursues 
improvements judged in the context of particular trajectories of 
democracy, justice, or other values.  Real, diverse people assess GG 
practices in light of their varied priorities and experiences; GG 
tries to put them into effective dialogue with each other. 
 
 
41 
 
This is what Nelson means by justice as just getting by (JGB).  
Nelson is not interested in analytical blueprints or abstract 
roadmaps that take people to predetermined justice.  Rather he 
seeks a more practical, seat-of-the-pants approach to justice that 
cannot be applied apart from the real problems of justice that 
ordinary people face every day.  In this sense, justice is “balancing . 
. . .  There is nothing meticulous or scientific about it.  . . . it is 
rough-and-ready.  It is just good enough to get by, at least for now” 
(2004, p. 9).  Playing on the ordinary-language connections 
between “just” as “fair” or “lawful” and “just” as “merely” or 
“barely,” Nelson draws attention to the hard challenges of figuring 
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out for different people what is just in any specific case.  Just 
getting by means that people seldom can or should apply abstract 
principles or original positions to assessing together what to do.  
Political action requires a notion of justice as just getting by. 
 
42 
 
Nelson reviews six conceptions of justice.  The Rawls notion of 
justice as fairness is what Nelson calls “justice as true measuring” 
(p. 5).  He characterizes the Rawls pursuit as a search for 
“impersonal algorithms of justice” (p. 5).  This “abstracts justice 
into applying criteria that supposedly suit all times and 
individuals” (p. 5).  Much justice, however, “resists statement in 
criteria for all conditions” (p. 1).  Just getting by means that “No 
universal criteria get met, no golden ideals are kept” (p. 3).  Such 
justice is “variable rather than universal, prudent more than 
rational.  Yet this public justice leaves the people vital and civil” (p. 
3). 
 
 
43 
 
Here I have argued the Pinochet precedent to be a vital, civil, 
prudent, yet variable exercise in justice.  It is a precedent rather 
than a rule.  It is a complicated case rather than a streamlined 
principle, and how it informs later action remains for diverse 
people to specify for their own workable acceptance in later 
situations.  The Pinochet case is a precedent for global governance, 
and it treats justice as just getting by. 
 
 
44 
 
Justice as just getting by is similar to that hallmark of British 
foreign policy:  muddling through (White 2002).  Brits have prided 
themselves on adapting to changing circumstances, such as the 
decline of British power around the globe after WW II.  They have 
acted, not by applying abstract principles specified in advance, but 
by adjusting earlier experiences and trajectories to present 
challenges. 
 
 
45 
 
A case in point is Tony Blair’s decision to go into Iraq “shoulder to 
shoulder” with George W. Bush in 2003.  Once it became obvious 
that George W. Bush was going to invade Iraq, regardless of UN or 
British opinions, Blair faced a painful decision:  have British forces 
invade with the US, or have Britain sit on the sidelines with some 
other NATO allies.  Press accounts suggest that principles of 
international law had little role in Blair’s choice.  Rather he seems 
to have made a cost-benefit calculation for that decision alone.  It 
emphasized the value to Britain of its “special relationship” with 
the United States.  This affirmed but also adjusted a trajectory at 
least as old as the Second World War and extended by Britain’s 
role in the earlier Gulf War led by the US.3 
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46 
 
The claim is not that the Bush-Blair invasion has been right or 
smart.  Nor is it that Bush has been just muddling through in 
response to 9/11, Saddam Hussein’s attempt to have Bush’s father 
assassinated, or a sense of unfinished business.  To a striking 
extent, in fact, Bush seems to have acted from abstract, a priori, 
often liberal principles of international order and justice.  The 
categorical declaration of war on terrorism is an easy example.  
The unqualified claim of national sovereignty is another.  In 
practical implementation, however, real perplexities can 
overwhelm nice principles.  To impose abstract models or balance 
fixed scales is to produce mistakes even in justice, because it 
prevents learning from the full field of specific information 
pertinent to any particular situation.  Blair, too, might have been 
mistaken in hitching the British war wagon to Bush’s.  But at least 
Blair’s mode of addressing the British situation could take the 
complications into adequate account. 
 
 
47 
 
There can be no global blueprint for advancing democracy.  There 
can be no global procedure for achieving justice.  Yet there can be 
specific actions and institutions that give us ways to work out 
particular improvements in our complex circumstances and actual 
trajectories.  Global governance is a repertoire of arrangements for 
confronting the troubles and opportunities of global 
interdependence more or less one at a time, with principles more 
evident in hindsight than prospect.  The many spheres of authority 
that worked together to produce the Pinochet precedent were ways 
for just getting by in that case and others.  As these somewhat 
satisfactory moves get us past acute problems or chronic 
perplexities, they become precedents.  Then their contributions to 
our practices of justice and democracy are no less – and often 
more – than the improvements made by any model specified in 
advance or template given in principle. 
 
 
48 
 
What can the Pinochet precedent tell us generally about the future 
of global governance?  It suggests that groups from civil society be 
included in GG processes.  At present, to be sure, they can 
participate mostly by breaking down doors to inner-circle 
negotiations.  The infamous Battle in Seattle at the WTO’s 1999 
ministerial meetings led the WTO to make a place for NGOs at that 
bargaining table.  Should developing nations be accorded more of 
voice in GG?  Bloc diplomacy might be their best device, because it 
has enjoyed some success at environmental conferences since 1992 
(Meyer 2004, pp. 286-288). 
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“enough” or what global devices serve justice the most across all 
circumstances.  Still the Pinochet precedent implies that global 
governance is real and potentially beneficial, especially when 
appreciated as practical arrangements for human rights.  That 
precedent also indicates how global governance can work without 
yoking it to some singular idea of democracy or an abstract code of 
justice that requires advance assent from almost everybody.  
Global governance that just gets by can serve us well. 
 
 
 
© William H. Meyer, 2005. 
 
 
 
 Notes  
 
 
 
1     On the whole, the book by Hewson and Sinclair is good enough 
on GG to make adjustments in its early principles worth the effort.  
 
 
 
2     The occasion was the 2004 Foundations of Political Theory 
Workshop on Political Myth, Rhetoric, and Symbolism.  The 
workshop is a prelude to annual meetings of the American Political 
Science Association, and most of its participants that year 
specialized in political theory or philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
3     I personally did not support the US-UK invasion of Iraq, nor 
would I have calculated the costs and benefits of British 
membership in Bush’s coalition as Blair did.  Largely unilateral 
invasions are not standard for global governance; in fact, such 
invasions are usually opposite to GG devices.  But GG can 
encompass apparently contradictory devices, because it pursues 
justice as just getting by – in much the same way as Blair did in 
2003 and Britain generally has done by moving case-by-case in 
foreign affairs.  British policies proceed from precedents and 
trajectories more than abstract principles. 
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